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A strategic analysis of incorporating CSR into managerial incentive design

Abstract
A strategic analysis is conducted to incorporate corporate social responsibility (CSR)
considerations into managerial incentive design in a duopoly where each firm comprises an
owner and a manager. Consumer surplus is adopted to represent the firms’ CSR concerns and a
CSR-related incentive is introduced to accommodate both profit and consumer surplus. Bertrand
and Cournot competition modes are discussed with the firms’ products being complementary,
independent, or substitutable. We first examine the equilibrium of CSR-related incentive design
and, then, analyze how CSR-related incentives affect the firms’ profitability and CSR
performance, measured by consumer surplus and social welfare.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Managerial incentive design; Bertrand competition;
Cournot competition; Product relationship; Equilibrium.

1. Introduction
Increasing attention has been paid to corporate social responsibility (CSR) in both practice
and academia. A large number of companies issue various CSR statements/activities in their
annual reports. A CSR trend report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers suggested that the number of
companies with CSR statements on their websites increased to 81% at the end of July 2010 from
75% at the end of July 2009. Another international survey by KPMG in 2008 showed that nearly
80% of the world’s largest 250 companies disclosed CSR reports, up from 50% in 2005. In job
markets, 88% of the job seekers would choose employers based on strong CSR values and 86%
would consider leaving if the companies’ CSR values no longer met their expectations
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The empirical studies above indicate that CSR has become an
important consideration from the perspective of various entities such as shareholders, managers
and consumers. Similarly, Vogel (2005) pointed out that 70% of the global chief executives
believe that CSR activities are vital to their companies’ profitability, suggesting that CSR is
critical to firms’ overall strategy and success. Furthermore, Lee (2008) observed that, although
the link between CSR and firms’ profitability is getting tighter, but it remains unclear whether it
is positive or negative. Motivated by these works, we attempt to provide a possible explanation
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for the relationship between CSR and firms’ profitability from a theoretical perspective.
Following the research in Goering (2007) and Kopel and Brand (2012), this paper adopts
consumer surplus as a proxy of the firms’ CSR concerns and introduces a CSR-related incentive
combining both profitability and consumer surplus. We study the strategic design of such CSRrelated incentives in a duopoly where each firm consists of an owner and a manager. We can find
duopolistic competition in the Canadian logistics industry such as the Canadian National and
Canadian Pacific Railways. It is supposed that each firm owner can choose a weight on CSR to
influence its manager’s market decision. First, we discuss whether the profit-driven firm owners
have motivation to offer their managers the CSR-related incentives. Second, we examine the
effect of the CSR-related incentives on the firms’ profitability and CSR performance as reflected
by consumer surplus and social welfare. We consider two market competition modes, Bertrand
and Cournot, and three product relationships: complementary, independent and substitutable
products. Bertrand and Cournot competition modes are both common in the logistics industry
(Brander and Zhang, 1990, 1993; Oum et al., 1993; Lijesen, 2004). Specifically, our research
questions are: Can the CSR-related incentives endogenously arise in equilibrium? If so, what is
the impact of such incentives on firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social welfare? How
do the competition mode and product relationship affect the equilibrium results and why?
Due to separation of ownership and management, contemporary firms are often
characterized by managerial delegation, where shareholders can induce professional managers to
operate their firms based on certain managerial incentives. Furthermore, the importance of
integrating CSR into managerial incentives has been discussed in existing research. Business
experts such as management scholars and compensation advisors tend to suggest a change in the
CEO compensation contract to incorporate CSR as part of the CEO remuneration (Coombs and
Gilley, 2005; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006). As reported by Dahlsrud (2008), despite many debates
on what CSR really embraces, stakeholders’ concerns are one of the most important dimensions
of CSR and consumers are admittedly among the most influential stakeholders of a firm. Russell
Reynolds Associates reported that 76 percent of investors consider incentive mechanisms as
either important or very important when dealing with social issues (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia,
2009).
Although previous research discussed CSR from the perspective of enhancing firms’ public
image, we take a different stance by examining CSR-related managerial incentive design from a
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strategic competition perspective, which is an important topic (Porter and Kramer, 2006). A key
finding is that the competing profit-driven owners always design the CSR-related incentive in
equilibrium (which is reduced to the pure-profit incentive with independent products).
Furthermore, for correlated products, we show that the owners’ strategic design of CSR-related
incentives does not necessarily enhance their profitability, but they always employ such
incentives in equilibrium for strategic competition purposes. Specifically, we find that the CSRrelated incentives serve as the owners’ strategic competition device to obtain more advantage
(under Cournot competition with complementary products and Bertrand competition with
substitutable products) or evade disadvantage (under Cournot competition with substitutable
products and Bertrand competition with complementary products). Compared with the
benchmark pure-profit incentives, the CSR-related incentives can either increase or decrease the
firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social welfare. In the case that both firms’ profits are
worsened by engaging in CSR-related incentives, the firms are forced to do so because they are
trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where the scenario that both firms’ profits are better off without
considering CSR is not an equilibrium. In addition, if one firm embraces CSR-related incentives
but the other does not, the latter’s profit will be even further worsened. The managerial insights
behind our results are as follows: First, whether the firms enhance their profitability by designing
the CSR-related incentives depends on both product relationship and the competition mode.
Second, whether the CSR-related managerial incentive design is beneficial to consumer surplus
and social welfare depends only on the competition mode.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the previous
literature related to this study. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the endogenous design of the CSRrelated incentives under Cournot and Bertrand competition modes, respectively. The paper
concludes in Section 5 with some remarks and suggestions for future research.

2. Literature Review
In general, this paper is related to two strands of literature: CSR and managerial incentive
design. First, CSR has attracted significant attention since 1960s, mainly driven by forwardthinking academics and social movements such as consumer rights and environmental
regulations, especially in the US. Initially, in the 1960s and 1970s, CSR was motivated by social
rather than economic considerations. Firms were trying to be philanthropic instead of expecting
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more profit from their CSR activities. Later, CSR research emphasized the relationship between
CSR and firm profitability (Vogel, 2005). Analogously, Lee (2008) observed that the link
between CSR and firms’ profits is getting tighter, but it remains unclear whether it is positive or
negative. For more understanding on CSR, readers are referred to Carroll and Shabana (2010)
and Schreck (2011) for excellent reviews. The aforementioned studies are either qualitative or
empirical, while we examine CSR-related incentive design using an analytical model, which is
identified as an important topic by Lee (2008). By considering CSR-related managerial incentive
design from the perspective of strategic competition rather than philanthropy, we provide a
possible theoretical explanation for the link between CSR and firms’ profitability.
Regarding other theoretical works, Goering (2008a) examined the durability decision of a
durable-goods monopoly with and without consumer welfare related social concern and found
that such social concern increases product durability if the firm can commit to its stakeholders,
while the opposite emerges otherwise. Goering (2010) further explored whether social concern
can increase a durable-goods firm’s profit and showed that the result depends on whether the
firm has the ability to make commitments in the sales market. Two differences exist between our
research and the aforesaid studies. First, existing research considered a monopolistic market,
while we consider a duopoly under two competition modes. Second, we integrate CSR into
managerial delegation in a private duopoly and discuss how such CSR-related incentive design
affects the firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social welfare, while Goering (2008a; 2010)
did not consider managerial incentive design. Barcos et al. (2013) examined the relationship
between inventory investment and firms’ CSR activities directed toward stakeholders. Apart
from the difference in research techniques, our focus is on the strategic design of the CSR-related
managerial incentives, whereas they discussed operational consequences of certain CSR
activities. Ye and Mukhopadhyay (2013) investigated altruistic behavior with CSR-related social
concerns between two competing vertically-differentiated firms. Our paper differs as we focus
on CSR-related incentive design, which is not considered by Ye and Mukhopadhyay (2013).
Unlike existing research, we focus on the endogenous design of CSR-related managerial
incentives with horizontal product differentiation under different competition modes.
CSR has also been studied in supply chains, either qualitatively and empirically (Boyd et al.,
2005, 2007; Amaeshi et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2000; Carter and Jennings, 2002; Miao et al.,
2012; Ageron et al., 2012), or using analytical models (Brand and Grothe, 2013; Cruz, 2008;
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Cruz and Wakolbinger, 2008; Goering, 2012, 2013; Hsueh, 2015; Ni et al., 2010; Ni and Li,
2012; Panda, 2014; Panda et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2015). While the aforementioned works studied
CSR in supply chains, we discuss whether duopolistic firms have social concerns under different
modes of horizontal competition. Furthermore, we combine the prevalent managerial incentives
with CSR and explore whether the firms are engaged in the CSR-related incentives in
equilibrium and how such incentives affect the firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social
welfare.
The second strand of related research lies in managerial incentive design literature. The
pioneer works in this respect are reported by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). This body of literature explored the strategic effect of incentives
with endogenous weights on sales and firm profitability. Subsequently, extensive research has
emerged by designing managerial incentives based on relative performance (Joh, 1999;
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Miller and Pazgal, 2001, 2002; Asseburg and Hofmann, 2010),
market share (Jansen et al., 2007, 2012; Ritz, 2008; Wang et al., 2009), process innovation and
product quality (Ishibashi, 2001; Overvest and Veldman, 2008; Veldman and Gaalman, 2014;
Veldman et al., 2014), to name a few. Our research differs from the above works in that we
consider the CSR-related managerial incentives incorporating consumer surplus into profitability,
which enable us to examine whether firms have social concerns on consumers and how the
outcomes vary with competition modes and product relationships. Some studies focused on sales
incentive design in the context of mixed oligopolies where not-for-profit public firms compete
with private firms (Barros, 1995; White, 2001; Heywood and Ye, 2009; Tomaru et al., 2011; Du
et al., 2013; Kopel and Marini, 2014). In contrast, we focus on two competing private firms’
CSR-related incentive design. For more research on strategic incentive design, readers are
referred to Sengul et al. (2012).
Yet, limited research investigated CSR-related managerial incentives. For instance, Goering
(2007) examined a mixed duopoly consisting of a public not-for-profit firm and a profit-driven
private firm, where the not-for-profit firm designs its managerial incentives based on consumer
surplus. Within the same mixed duopoly, Kopel and Brand (2012) extended the work of Goering
(2007) by allowing the private firm to design its sales-oriented managerial incentive. Goering
(2008b) discussed the welfare effect in a mixed oligopoly and found that a shift from the pureprofit behavior by a not-for-profit firm may decrease social welfare. Since CSR is not merely
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restricted to public or not-for-profit firms, our research differs from the works above in several
aspects. First, we examine two private firms’ endogenous design of the CSR-related incentives,
while their research assumed that only the public firm adopts CSR-related incentives and the
private firm is merely sales driven. Second, we consider both Cournot and Bertrand competition
modes with differentiated goods, but they only studied Cournot competition with homogenous
goods.

3. The model and incentive analysis under Cournot competition
Consider two firms, firms 1 and 2, characterized by separate management and ownership.
Each firm (firm i) consists of an owner (owner i) who owns the firm and a manager (manager i)
who makes market decisions based on the incentive contract designed by the corresponding firm
owner.
Following Singh and Vives (1984), we assume the standard consumer surplus as
gross utility
expenditure

1


CS =  ( qi + q j ) − ( qi2 + q 2j ) −  qi q j  − ( pi qi + p j q j ) , i, j = 1, 2; i  j ,
2



(1)

where CS stands for consumer surplus, and pi and qi ( i = 1, 2 ) denote product i’s retail price and
quantity, respectively. Note that the first term of the right-hand side of Eq. (1) denotes the gross
utility of consumers before purchase, while the second term represents consumers’ total payment
for purchasing qi ( i = 1, 2 ) units of products. Overall, the difference between these two terms
denotes the consumer surplus after purchase. This form of utility function yields the linear
demand structure as shown in Eq. (2) (Singh and Vives, 1984).
Maximizing Eq. (1) with respect to quantities, we obtain the inverse demand as

pi ( qi , q j ) =  − qi −  q j , i, j = 1, 2; i  j ,

(2)

 is the reservation price and   ( −1,1) measures product differentiation with   ( −1,0 ) , 0 and
  ( 0,1) representing complementary, independent, and substitutable products, respectively.
Inverting Eq. (2), we obtain the direct demand as

qi ( pi , p j ) =

(1 −  )  − pi +  p j
1−  2
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, i, j = 1, 2; i  j .

(3)

This section adopts Eq. (2) to examine CSR-related incentive design under Cournot
competition. The case of Bertrand competition is analyzed in Section 4 by using Eq. (3). To
focus on the strategic effect, both firms’ marginal costs are normalized to zero, which also helps
to avoid unnecessary complexity without qualitatively changing our results.
Based on the seminal works of Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987), we consider whether the profit-driven firm owners endogenously design the CSR-related
incentives in equilibrium. Each manager’s compensation structure contains a fixed lump-sum
payment Fi plus a variable component that is proportional to a linear combination of profit and
consumer surplus  i + i CS under the CSR-related incentive, where  i and  i are firm i’s
profit and incentive parameter/weight, respectively. Thus, each manager’s salary is given by

Fi + i  i under the pure-profit incentive or Fi + i (  i + i CS ) under the CSR-related incentive,
where i is a positive scale parameter to the variable portion of the compensation. Without loss
of generality, it is assumed that each manager’s highest reservation utility from outside
opportunities is U . Mathematically, owner i’s problem under the CSR-related incentive is given
by

 Max  Oi =  i −  Fi + i (  i + i CS ) 
 Fi ,i ,i

,
 s.t.
U = F +   +  CS  U
)
i
i(
i
i
 Mi

(4)

where the subscripts ‘Oi’ and ‘Mi’ denote owner i and manager i, respectively. Apparently, each
owner will set the values of Fi and i to adjust its manager’s compensation such that the
constraint in Eq. (4) becomes binding, i.e., Fi = U − i (  i + i CS ) . This incentive structure is a
standard two-part tariff contract which will not distort the managers’ decisions. Based on this,
manager i’s problem under the CSR-related incentive is to maximize his/her compensation
U Mi =  i + i CS by setting a price (or quantity) and owner i’s problem is to maximize

 Oi =  i − U by setting an optimal CSR weight. Since U is a constant, owner i’s problem is

equivalent to profit maximization.
Based on the discussions above, we see that each manager’s problem is to maximize its
compensation stipulated by the CSR incentive and each owner’s objective is to choose the
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optimal incentive weight for profit maximization.
We consider the following sequence of decisions. In the first stage, the owners
simultaneously decide the endogenous weights of the CSR-related incentives for profit
maximization. In the second stage, given the CSR-related incentives offered by their owners, the
managers compete by simultaneously setting the quantities (or prices under Bertrand competition
in Section 4) of the products in the product market. In what follows, we employ backward
induction to ensure sub-game perfection.
Under the CSR-related incentives, the managers’ problems are given by
Q
MaxU Mi
= pi ( qi , q j ) qi + i CS , i, j = 1, 2; i  j .

(5)

qi

where the superscript ‘Q’ indicates Cournot competition mode.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) can be obtained by substituting the inverse demand into
Eq. (5) and differentiating each manager’s objective with respect to its corresponding quantity.
Solving the FOCs yields the optimal responses as

 −  (1 − 1 ) q2
 Q
q1 ( q2 ,1 ) =
2 − 1

.

q Q ( q , ) =  −  (1 −  2 ) q1
 2 1 2
2 − 2


(6)

The intersection of the managers’ reactions in Eq. (6) determines the equilibrium quantities
as functions of incentive weights i ( i = 1, 2 ) :
 Q
( 2 −  2 ) −  (1 − 1 )  
q1 (1 , 2 ) =
( 2 − 1 )( 2 −  2 ) −  2 (1 − 1 )(1 −  2 )

.

( 2 − 1 ) −  (1 −  2 )  
 Q
q2 (1 , 2 ) = ( 2 −  )( 2 −  ) −  2 (1 −  )(1 −  )
1
2
1
2


(7)

We first denote the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives with i Q = 0 ( i = 1, 2 ) . The
optimal solutions under this case can be obtained by substituting i Q = 0 ( i = 1, 2 ) into Eq. (7)
and then backward. We summarize the results under the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR)
incentives in the second column of Table 1.
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In order to compare with the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives, in what follows we
solve for optimal CSR incentive weights. Substituting Eq. (7) into the owners’ profit functions
and solving them, we have

iQ =

2 + 2  +  2 − 4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4
, i = 1, 2 .
2 (1 +  )

(8)

Based on Eq. (8), other optimal solutions under the CSR-related incentives are obtained and
summarized in the last column of Table 1.
Table 1. Solutions under Cournot competition.
Pure-profit incentives

CSR-related incentives

0

2 + 2  +  2 − 4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4
2 (1 +  )

Incentive
weight

Price

Quantity

Profit
Consumer
surplus
Social
welfare

)

(


2+ 

4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 − 2  −  2 
4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 + 2 −  2



2

2+ 

2 −  + 4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4
2

2
2
(2 +  )

2

(

(1 +  )  2
2
(2 +  )

(

4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 + 2 −  2

(

(3 +  ) 2
2
(2 +  )

4

(

)
)

4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 − 2  −  2  2

4 (1 +  )  2
4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 + 2 −  2

)

2

2

)

4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 + 1 −  −  2  2

(

4 + 8 + 4  2 +  4 + 2 −  2

)

2

We now present the equilibrium incentives under Cournot competition.
Proposition 1. Under Cournot competition, iQ  0 , where the equality holds if and only if

 = 0 . Compared to the pure-profit incentives, the CSR-related incentives enhance both firms’
profitability if   ( −1, 0 ) but make them worse off if   ( 0,1) .
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 indicates that, under the Cournot competition mode, both owners choose the
pure-profit incentives (  i = 0 ) in equilibrium if the products are independent (  = 0 ). In this
Q

case, there is no competition between the two firms in the product market (i.e., in Eq. (6), qi
does not interact with q j ), and each firm is a monopoly and each owner’s interference using a
non-zero incentive weight will make its objective deviate from the optimal profitability. Thus,
Q

the owners engage in the pure-profit incentives by setting  i = 0 in equilibrium without
interfering with their respective managers’ decisions.
When the products are complementary or substitutable (   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) ), each owner
chooses the CSR-related incentive in equilibrium, with a positive weight on CSR. It is standard
in managerial economics that the Cournot competition is often not as aggressive as desired
(Miller and Pazgal, 2001). In this case, each owner’s CSR-related incentive design serves as its
more aggressive competition. For this purpose, each owner has to set a positive weight on CSR
(with its manager being rewarded) to induce a higher quantity since a negative weight penalizing
CSR leads to a lower quantity, which means even less competition. Specifically, given that
owner 1 chooses the pure-profit incentive, owner 2 will act more aggressively by choosing the
CSR-related incentive to make more profit, which will benefit (hurt) owner 1 if the products are
complementary (substitutable). The logic is as follows: as shown in Eq. (6), an increase in one
firm’s quantity will increase (reduce) the quantity of the other firm if the products are
complementary (substitutable). In anticipation of this, owner 1 will further intensify the
competition by switching from the pure-profit incentive to the CSR-related incentive to pursue
more profit (with complements), or avoid profit loss (with substitutes).
Generally speaking, the equilibrium CSR-related incentives do not necessarily lead to higher
profit for the owners compared to the benchmark pure-profit incentives. First, the firms benefit
from engaging in the CSR-related incentives when products are complementary. This is due to
the fact that, if the products are complementary (   ( −1,0 ) ), the firms’ quantity decisions are
mutually enhancing: the increase of one firm’s quantity will simultaneously enhance the quantity
of the other firm (Eq. (6)). On the other hand, when products are substitutable, the CSR-related
incentives make both owners’ profitability worse off. The reason is as follows: if the products are
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substitutable (   ( 0,1) ), the firms’ quantity decisions are in conflict with each other, i.e., the
increase of one firm’s quantity will reduce the quantity supply of the other firm (Eq. (6)).
Proposition 2. iQ ( i = 1, 2 ) increases as products become more substitutable or complementary,
i.e., iQ increases in  .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that, under Cournot competition, the equilibrium weights of the CSRrelated incentives increase as products’ relationship (substitutable or complementary) level
increases. This is explained as follows. In Cournot competition, the owners employ the CSRrelated incentives to overcome the under-aggressiveness of the managers’ quantity decisions. As
the products become more related (substitutable or complementary), the interdependence
between the managers’ interaction become stronger, which motivates the owners to set a higher
incentive weight to induce the managers to make more aggressive decisions.
Let CS

Q

Q

and CS , respectively, stand for the equilibrium consumer surplus with CSR-

related and pure-profit incentives under Cournot competition.
Proposition 3. Under Cournot competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to increase
consumer surplus compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., CS Q  CS

Q

with equality

holding if and only if  = 0 .
Proof. See Appendix.
When  = 0 , Proposition 1 indicates the CSR-related incentives are reduced to pure-profit
incentives and, hence, consumer surplus is identical for the two cases. Next, our interpretation
focuses on the case with correlated products (   0 ). Proposition 3 suggests that, under Cournot
competition with correlated products, the CSR-related incentives yield higher consumer surplus
than the pure-profit incentives do. As the CSR incentive weights are positive in this case, both
firms can be interpreted as consumer-friendly. Under the CSR-related incentives, each firm
always produces a higher quantity level than that under the pure-profit incentives, thereby
resulting in higher consumer surplus for correlated (substitutable or complementary) products.
Let SW

Q

Q

and SW , respectively, represent the equilibrium social welfare with CSR-

related and pure-profit incentives under Cournot competition.
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Proposition 4. Under Cournot competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to increase social
welfare compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., SW Q  SW

Q

with equality holding if and

only if  = 0 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Once again, the special case of  = 0 results in the same social welfare for the two
incentives. For correlated products, Proposition 4 demonstrates that the CSR-related incentives
yield higher social welfare than the pure-profit incentives do under Cournot competition. The
reason is as follows. Social welfare comprises firms’ profits and consumer surplus. When the
products are substitutable, our results suggest that, while both firms’ profits decrease, the
increase in consumer surplus (Proposition 3) is more than enough to offset the decrease in profit
(Proposition 1). On the other hand, when the products are complementary, the firms’ profits and
consumer surplus are both higher under the CSR-related incentives, yielding higher social
welfare than that under the pure-profit incentives. In sum, under Cournot competition, social
welfare is always higher under the CSR-related incentives than under the pure-profit incentives
as long as the products are substitutable or complementary.

4. Incentive analysis under Bertrand competition
In this section, we proceed to examine the CSR-related incentive design under Bertrand
competition. The managers’ problems are given by
P
MaxU Mi
= pi qi ( pi , p j ) + i CS , i, j = 1, 2; i  j .

(9)

pi

where the superscript ‘P’ indicates the Bertrand competition mode.
Substituting the inverse demand functions into Eq. (9) and solving the resulting FOCs yield
the optimal responses as

 (1 −  )(1 − 1 ) +  (1 − 1 ) p2
 P
 p1 ( p2 ,1 ) =
2 − 1

.

 p P ( p , ) =  (1 −  )(1 −  2 ) +  (1 −  2 ) p1
 2 1 2
2 − 2


(10)

The intersection of the managers’ reaction functions in Eq. (10) determines the equilibrium
prices as functions of incentive weights i ( i = 1, 2 ) :

13

piP (i , j ) =

(1 −  )(1 − i ) ( 2 −  j ) −  (1 −  j ) 
,
( 2 − i ) ( 2 −  j ) −  2 (1 − i ) (1 −  j )

i, j = 1, 2; i  j .

(11)

Similar to Cournot competition, we denote the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives
under Bertrand competition with i P = 0 ( i = 1, 2 ) for comparison. The optimal solutions under
the pure-profit (no CSR) incentives can be obtained by substituting i P = 0 ( i = 1, 2 ) into the
relevant expressions above. We summarize the benchmark results in the second column of Table
2.
Now we solve for the optimal CSR incentive weights. Substituting Eq. (11) into the owners’
profit functions and solving them, we obtain

iP =

1−  2 −1
1−  2

, i = 1, 2 .

(12)

Based on Eq. (12), remaining solutions are derived and summarized in the last column of
Table 2.

Table 2. Solutions under Bertrand competition.
Pure-profit incentives

CSR-related incentives

Incentive
weight

Price

1 −  2 −1
0

1−  2



(1 −  ) + 1 −  2  



(1 +  )( 2 −  )

( 1 −  + 1)
(1 +  + 1 −  )
2 (1 +  ) ( 1 −  + 1)
2

2

(1 −  ) 

2

Quantity

2−

Profit

(1 −  )  2
2
(1 +  )( 2 −  )

Consumer

2

surplus

(1 +  )( 2 −  )

2

)(
)
4 (1 +  ) ( 1 −  + 1)

(1 −  +

1−  2 1+  + 1−  2  2
2

2

(1 +  +

2

4 (1 +  )
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1−  2

(

)
2

2

)

1−  2 +1

2

Social
welfare

(1 +  +

( 3 − 2 )  2
2
(1 +  )( 2 −  )

)(3 −  + 3 1 −  )
4 (1 +  ) ( 1 −  + 1)
1−  2

2

2

2

2

Similar to Cournot competition in Section 3, we have
Proposition 5. Under Bertrand competition, iP  0 , where the equality holds if and only if

 = 0 . Compared with the pure-profit incentives, the CSR-related incentives lower both firms’
profitability if   ( −1, 0 ) and helps them achieve a win-win outcome if   ( 0,1) .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 reports that the equilibrium is reduced to the pure-profit incentives ( iP = 0 )
if the products are independent (  = 0 ) under Bertrand competition. The reason is the same as
that under Cournot competition: when the products are independent, there is no competition in
the product market and both firms are independent monopolies ( pi and p j do not interact with
each other in Eq. (10) when  = 0 ).
On the other hand, both owners choose the CSR-related incentive strategies in equilibrium
if the products are complementary or substitutable (   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) ). Due to the fact that the
Bertrand mode leads to intense competition in the product market, both owners have incentives
to lower the degree of competition (Miller and Pazgal, 2001). To this end, each owner sets a
negative weight on CSR to penalize its manager with the purpose of inducing higher retail prices
to mitigate competition (a positive weight on CSR leads to lower prices and even more intense
competition). Specifically, if owner 1 chooses the pure-profit incentive, owner 2 will choose the
CSR-related incentive to soften the competition for better profit, which will hurt (benefit) owner
1 if the products are complementary (substitutable). The reason is as follows: as shown in Eq.
(10), the increase in a firm’s price will decrease (increase) the price of the other firm if the
products are complementary (substitutable). Knowing this, owner 1 will further soften the
competition by shifting from the pure-profit incentive to the CSR-related incentive to avert
disadvantage with complementary products or enhance its profitability with substitutable
products.
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Similar to Proposition 1, compared with the benchmark pure-profit incentives, the
equilibrium CSR-related incentives do not necessarily guarantee better profits for the owners.
When the products are complementary (   ( −1, 0 ) ), the CSR-related incentives make both firm
owners’ profitability worse off because the firms’ price decisions are in mutual conflict, i.e., the
increase of one firm’s price will reduce the price of the other firm (Eq. (10)). In contrast, when
products are substitutable (   ( 0,1) ), both owners benefit from engaging in the CSR-related
incentives as the firms’ price decisions are mutually enhancing: the rise of one firm’s price will
simultaneously increase the price of the other firm (Eq. (10)).
Putting Propositions 1 and 5 together, one can see that the impact of the CSR-related
incentives on the firms’ profitability is opposite for complementary (substitutable) products
under Bertrand and Cournot competition modes. In other words, compared with the benchmark
pure-profit incentives, whether the CSR-related incentives enhance the firms’ profitability
depends on both product relationship and the competition mode. This result sheds clear insights
for firm owners: a win-win scenario is achievable and a lose-lose situation can be avoided by
carefully examining their competition strategy and product relationship and, then designing an
appropriate managerial incentive accordingly.
Proposition 6. iP ( i = 1, 2 ) decreases as the products become more substitutable or
complementary, i.e., iP decreases in  .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6 suggests that, under Bertrand competition, the equilibrium weights on the
CSR-related incentives decrease in the degree of product differentiation. The intuition is as
follows. In Bertrand competition, both owners employ the CSR-related incentives to soften the
excessive competition. As the products become more related (substitutable or complementary),
the interdependence between the managers’ decisions becomes stronger, which motivates the
owners to set more negative incentive weights to induce the managers to make less competitive
decisions.
P

P

Let CS and CS , respectively, denote the equilibrium consumer surplus with CSR-related
and pure-profit incentives under Bertrand competition.

16

Proposition 7. Under Bertrand competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to decrease
consumer surplus compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., CS P  CS

P

with equality

holding if and only if  = 0 .
Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Proposition 7 is in contrast to that of Proposition 3. The special case of  = 0
is trivial. For correlated products (   0 ), Proposition 7 suggests that, under Bertrand
competition, consumer surplus is higher under the pure-profit incentives than that under the
CSR-related incentives, which is reasonable as a negative CSR incentive weight implies that
owners are unfriendly to consumers (and, hence, CSR). This implies that, under Bertrand
competition, the CSR-related incentives are always detrimental to consumer surplus as long as
the products are not independent. Combining with Proposition 3, for correlated products, we can
see that whether the CSR-related incentives increase or decrease consumer surplus only depends
on the competition mode.
Let SW

P

P

and SW , respectively, express the equilibrium social welfare with CSR-related

and pure-profit incentives under Bertrand competition.
Proposition 8. Under Bertrand competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to decrease social
P

welfare compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., SW P  SW with equality holding if and
only if  = 0 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Once again, the special case of independent products (  = 0 ) leads to identical social
welfare for the two incentives as CSR-related incentives are reduced to pure-profit profits. For
correlated products, in contrast to Proposition 4, Proposition 8 shows that social welfare under
CSR-related incentives is lower than that under pure-profit incentives. The reason is as follows:
when the products are substitutable, the increase in the firms’ profit (Proposition 5) is
insufficient to offset the decrease in consumer surplus (Proposition 7). On the other hand, when
the products are complementary, both the firms’ profits and consumer surplus are reduced,
leading to lower social welfare. Therefore, under Bertrand competition, social welfare is always
lower under consumer-unfriendly CSR-related incentives than that under pure-profit incentives
for correlated products. In combination with Proposition 4, we demonstrate that the competition
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mode determines whether the CSR-related incentives increase or decrease social welfare for
correlated products. The results of Section 3 and Section 4 are summarized in Table 3 as follows.

18

Table 3. The summary of the results.

Incentive sensitivity

Cournot competition

Bertrand Competition

iQ  0 increases in 

iP  0 decreases in 

analysis
Firms’ profitability

 Qi   iQ if   ( −1, 0 ) , with

 iP   iP if   ( −1, 0 ) ,

equality holding if and only if  = 0 .

with equality holding if and

 Qi   iQ if   ( 0,1) .

only if  = 0 .
 iP   iP if   ( 0,1) .

Consumer surplus

Social welfare

Q

P

CS Q  CS , with equality holding if

CS P  CS , with equality

and only if  = 0 .

holding if and only if  = 0 .

Q

Q

SW Q  SW , with equality holding

SW Q  SW , with equality

if and only if  = 0 .

holding if and only if  = 0 .

5. Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the strategic design of CSR-related managerial incentives in a
duopoly and examines both Bertrand and Cournot competition modes. We first analyze whether
the profit-driven firm owners have motivation to design CSR-related incentives and, then, study
how such incentives affect the firms’ profitability, consumer surplus, and social welfare by
comparing with the benchmark pure-profit incentives.
In equilibrium, we find that both owners always employ the CSR-related incentives for their
managers, with the equilibrium reducing to the pure-profit (no CSR) incentives if the products
are independent. With correlated products, equilibrium analysis suggests that the firms are CSRfriendly under Cournot competition and CSR-unfriendly under Bertrand competition. By
comparing with the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives we obtain the following
managerial insights. First, the impact of the CSR-related managerial incentive design on the
firms’ profitability depends on both the competition mode and product relationship. Second, the
mode of competition is the only determinant for the impact of the CSR-related managerial
incentive design on consumer surplus and social welfare.
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Several possible extensions can be carried out in future research. First, the duopolistic
setting can be extended to an oligopolistic framework to examine the effect of the number of
firms on the CSR-related managerial incentive design. Second, this paper focuses on horizontal
competition, while further research can investigate a vertical market structure in the context of
supply chains. Third, we consider the simultaneous incentive design problem here, but sequential
incentive design warrants further research. Finally, it is also worthwhile to examine incentive
design with asymmetric firms.

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, It is trivial to verify that iQ = 0 if  = 0 . Next, we prove iQ  0 if   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) .
Simple calculation shows that, both the denominator and numerator of iQ are positive if
  ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) .

Second, based on the solutions in Table 1, we have
4 (1 +  )  −2 − 4 − 2 2 −  3 + (1 +  ) 4 + 8 + 4 2 +  4   2

 , i = 1, 2 .
 − =
2
2
2
2
4
( 2 +  ) 2 −  + 4 + 8 + 4  + 
Q
Oi

Q
Oi

)

(

Q

Q
It can be verified that  Oi −  Oi  0 (a win-win outcome) for   ( −1, 0 ) (products are
Q

Q
complementary) and  Oi −  Oi  0 (a lose-lose outcome) for   ( 0,1) (products are

substitutable).

Proof of Proposition 2.

(

2
4
2
iQ  ( 2 +  ) 4 + 8 + 4 +  − 
=
Since
2

2 4 + 8 + 4 2 +  4 (1 +  )

) has the same sign as  , which means 

Q
i

decreases in  when   ( −1, 0 ) (products are complementary), and increases in  when
  ( 0,1) (products are substitutable).
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Proof of Proposition 3.
It is easy to verify that CS Q = CS if  = 0 . Next, we consider the case that   0 .
Q



2 (1 +  )  4 + 4  + 2  2 −  4 − ( 2 −  2 )  4 + 4  2 + 8 + 4   2
Q

 .
CS Q − CS =
2
2

( 2 +  )  2 −  2 +  4 + 4  2 + 8 + 4 


Since the term in the square brackets in the numerator is always positive for   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) ,
Q

we have CS Q − CS  0 .

Proof of Proposition 4.
One can easily check that SW Q = SW

Q

if  = 0 . Next, we examine the case that   0 .



2 (1 +  )  −  4 − 4 3 − 6 2 − 12 − 4 + (  2 + 4 + 2 )  4 + 4 2 + 8 + 4   2
Q

 .
SW Q − SW =
2
2

( 2 +  )  2 −  2 +  4 + 4  2 + 8 + 4 


As the term in the square bracket in the numerator is always positive for   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) , we
Q

can verify that SW Q − SW  0 .

Proof of Proposition 5.
First, it is easy to verify that iP = 0 if  = 0 and iP  0 if   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) . Second, based
on the solutions in Table 2, we have
P
Oi

P
 Oi
− =

 1 −  2 − (1 −  )2   2 2



(

2 (1 +  )( 2 −  ) 1 + 1 − 
2

2

)

2

, i = 1, 2 .

P

P
One can see that  Oi −  Oi  0 (a lose-lose outcome) for   ( −1, 0 ) (products are
P

P
complementary) and  Oi −  Oi  0 (a win-win outcome) for   ( 0,1) (products are

substitutable).

Proof of Proposition 6.
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iP

P
=−
Since
increases in  when
3/2 has the opposite sign to  , which means i

(1 +  )
  ( −1, 0 ) (products are complementary) and decreases in

 when   ( 0,1) (products are

substitutable).

Proof of Proposition 7.
If  = 0 , it is easy to see that CS P = CS . If   0 , we have
P

P

CS − CS =
P

(1 −  ) ( 2 − 3 2 +  3 − 2
(1 +  )( 2 −  )

2

(1 −  +

)
1−  )

1−  2  2
2

.

2

Thus, we verify that CS P − CS  0 if   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) .
P

Proof of Proposition 8.
If  = 0 , it is trivial to check that SW P = SW . If   0 , one has
P

P

SW − SW = −
P

(

)

 2 (1 −  ) 3 − 2 + 1 −  2  2

(

2 (1 +  )( 2 −  ) 1 + 1 − 
2

2

)

2

.

Therefore, we can confirm that SW P − SW  0 for   ( −1, 0 )  ( 0,1) .
P
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